| |||
|
|
They are not changing the substance of the problem. They still want to separate but they do not have the guts to say so. Prime Minister Jean Chretien.1 |
|
In 1980, after the majority of Quebecers voted “No” at the First Referendum, the separatist leader Rene Levesque promised: “A la prochaine fois” – until next time.2 The next time came fifteen years later, on October 30, 1995. The question Quebecers were to answer was not about sovereignty only. It also included a proposal of the “new partnership” to the federal government. It included a notion of a common economical space between two states, joint political institutions, and shared responsibilities in some areas. In other words, there would be an independent state on one side and continuum of federalism on the other. It was a really odd combination of ideas, theories, and proposals. The purpose of such mixture was to win support among “soft nationalists” of Quebec, who neither showed support nor hostility toward sovereignty, to assure suspicious non-francophones that their rights would not be violated, and to deny that any economic problems would occur once sovereignty is achieved. Would everything worked out smoothly as described? No, it would not. First of all, the “new partnership” was only an offer that the other side, Canada, was not willing to accept easily. Then, the “partnership” was not a requirement but only an addition to sovereignty. Quebec could stop negotiations but the independence would be declared in any case. Finally, a “Yes” vote would definitely cause a constitutional and economical crisis, the consequences of which are hard to imagine. Lets not hurry with the judgment, though. Overall, the “new partnership” sounded reasonable. It would provide a chance for Quebecers to secure their identity and to use the right of self–determination. At the same time the economic ties would be preserved. But it could sound like an ultimatum and a certain way of the destruction of Canada, because of the time it would be propose, right after the “Yes” referendum. In order to make it workable all negotiations should be pre – referendum. Only in the case of pre – established basis the “new partnership” would work. An understanding of why Quebec would want to separate in the first place requires serious research. Taking in consideration the length of the essay and its topic, the best answer to the question are the words of Marc–Andre Bedard, a lawyer in Chicoutimi. He said, “…we (Quebecers) do not want to be stirred into the Canadian melting pot, we do not want to be equals among equals, we want to keep our society proud and distinct…”3 These were the issues that created a background for the referendums both in 1980 and 1995. On Monday, October 30, 1995, 93.52% of eligible voters came to the polling places all over Quebec. 50.4% of them, or 2,362,648, voted “No” and 49.6%, or 2,308,360, voted “Yes”. Quebec stayed in Canada.4 One year before, in October 1994, when the Parti Quebecois came to power and planning for the referendum just started, the gap was more significant and Ottawa was confident in its victory. It all changed in April 1995, when Mr. Bouchard, the leader of the Bloc Quebecois and the most popular politician in Quebec, offered a plan of post-secession political and economic integration with Canada, the virage. The final version of the Referendum proposal appeared on the 12-th of June 1995. That day three major political players in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois – Mr. Parizeau, the Bloc Quebecois – Mr. Bouchard, and the Action Democratique du Quebec – Mario Dumont, signed an agreement, which “formalized the new direction of the sovereignty movement”. 5 The notion of “new partnership” was based on the existence of two sovereign states, Canada and Quebec, two equal partners in an economic union. The final proposal consisted of two parts: a vote for sovereignty and an offer to establish a new economic and political partnership between Quebec and Canada. Sovereignty was defined as “the power of Quebec to levy all of its taxes, pass all of its laws, and sign al of its treaties.”6 Basically, the notion of independence was based on the dissatisfaction with the existing federal system and highly centralized governance (Keep in mind that federal system in Canada in not particularly centralized). The frustration was caused by the interference of the Federal Government in the provincial affairs. The second part of the proposal, the “new partnership”, described the kind of relationships would exist between Quebec and Canada if the majority voted “Yes”. A general treaty, which covered a wide range of issues (especially economic ones), would regulate all affairs between the two nations. Such legal frame would establish rules for sharing of assets and common debt, create a custom union, assure free movement of capital, labor force, goods, and services, allow dual citizenship for Quebecers, and have Canadian dollar as a common currency. Later the partnership could be extended into such areas as internal and international trade, transportation, common representatives in international organizations, defense, crime fighting, postal services, and a number of others. In the next part of the proposal it was suggested that new political institutions would be created in order to regulate the existence in the common economic space. Most of those institutions were similar to those of the European Union. For example, there would be a council with an equal number of ministers from each state responsible for interpretation and implementation of the general treaty. The proposal also mentioned a parliamentary assembly composed of appointed members from the House of Commons (75%) and the National Assembly (25%). Despite the fact it would be resemble a parliament, this institution would have no legislative power. A joint tribunal would exist as well. With the power to settle disputes it would be the most influential institution of all. Finally, each side would have a right of veto in any negotiations. The idea of the “new partnership” was clearly populist in nature. Designed to attract “soft nationalists”, it was not “the new direction of the sovereignty movement” but rather a new way of saying old things. Indeed, the propositions of a common economic space and joint political institutions were present in earlier radical talks of independence. Only then a common space was viewed as granted, a state of things the rest of Canada would not destroy out of fear of economical crisis, and a perfect guarantee that sooner or later Ottawa would have to negotiate in order to create a joint authority. The referendum proposal of that kind, however, sounded speculative to those in Quebec who were more concerned about financial welfare than constitution and, thus, was not popular enough to be voted “Yes”. It was exactly the case in 1980 when the PQ lost the first Referendum and in October of 1994 when the planning for the second Referendum began. According to the polls only 45% were in favor of Quebec sovereignty. A 10% gap was enough to give the federal center a sense of the favorable outcome.7 At the same time it forced the leaders of the PQ to change their tactics. It involved an official declaration of several points that were implicit – an attempt to soften the idea of sovereignty. There could be an illusion that the idea of independence was buried under the weight of the new partnership. But again, it was only a proposal, which surely did not mean that an actual agreement between Quebec and Canada would be easily reached. Both parties involved understood that for Ottawa such post-referendum negotiations would be nothing more than throwing punches after the fight was over and for Quebec the fulfillment of some promises could simply mean giving up the part of hardly earned sovereignty. Does this mean that the new partnership was a populist proposal, which would exist on paper only? The long history of dead-end negotiations answers “Yes”. Another thing that can add doubts to the seriousness of the new partnership was the interpretation of a positive referendum result. As stated by Robert Young, “… a Yes victory would empower the National Assembly to proclaim the sovereignty of Quebec… the government to propose to Canada a treaty on a new economic and political Partnership; … if the negotiations proved fruitless, the assembly will be empowered to declare the sovereignty of Quebec without further delay.”8 In other words, a Yes referendum would mean the proclamation of sovereignty, it automatic, though not immediate, declaration and an offer to Canada, which would not change anything. Even those politicians who signed the final version of the referendum proposal on the 12-th of June and declared their good faith and commitment to reach a post–referendum agreement with Canada, were not speaking about the “new partnership” in the terms of a prerequisite for sovereignty. Jacques Parizeau, Quebec’s premier at that time, said: “…if Canada refuses, Quebec will become sovereign non the less.”9 Lucien Bouchard, the author of the virage, was more specific saying, “…a Yes vote will lead inexorably to sovereignty of Quebec.”10 One might conclude that the “new partnership” was a way of tricking “soft nationalists” and had no chances to be brought to life. Well, such assumption would be wrong. The very idea that all connections would be immediately broken is an absurd one. Surely some kind of the “new partnership” would be created in order to regulate economical and political relations. But would the negotiations be fair and easy? Lets imagine the situation after the “Yes” referendum: Quebec is sovereign at last and proposes the “new partnership” to the rest of Canada, which is considered to be at the very edge of a constitutional and economical crisis. So, what factors would create an atmosphere for the post-referendum discussions? The Canadian society would possibly be destabilized. Among other things the legitimacy of the secession would be thoroughly examined this could lead to controversial interpretations of the constitution. Some experts predict a significant raise in interest rates and inflation. Even before the referendum the market was controlled by rumors and possible predictions of the referendum outcome. In early October, for example, an Angus Reid poll showed an increasing support for the sovereignty. At the same time the Canadian dollar dropped 72 basic points and the Toronto stock exchange TSE slipped 37 points. 11 Moreover, we should not forget about the minorities, such as the First Nations, who felt very strongly about staying in Canada, and immigrants, who could have a different opinion than the majority but no right to express it. Referendum could also cause a wave of mutual mistrust and even hostility. Mike Harris, premier of Ontario, stated that “…if Quebec separates, Ontario would trade with it on no different a basis than it trades with other foreign countries… We would have no special obligations tied to history or common national interest… there would be international borders… and borders do matter.”12 At last, we should always keep in mind that the negotiations are not to be quick and easy because of the difficulty of issues and number of parties involved. That would be the time Quebec propose a new formula – “Two states, one system”, the time for negotiations and big compromises from Canada, which supposedly would beg to preserve the common space. Such system would allow Quebec to enjoy the continuum of the federation, in such areas as economy and citizenship, and, at the same time, to be under no political influence from the outside whatsoever. Only God knows what could have worked out of this proposal in the long–run. The short–term effects of the “Yes” referendum, however, could send shock waves so strong that the very existence of Canada would be questioned. Now lets suppose for a second that somehow the every idea of Quebec sovereignty would not be shocking and disturbing. At that case the Canadian society would recognize the right of self-determination and be willing to form a partnership. What conditions might be necessary in the actual secession process then? In my opinion, the most important of all is the pre-referendum nature of negotiations, or, at least, an official agreement should be a prerequisite for the sovereignty. First, Canada and Quebec should reach an arrangement, its terms, and determine responsibilities of both sides. Also, the parties should work out a legislative base that would clarify any questions and leave no room for controversial interpretations. Only then, with a clear idea of what would happen if …, a referendum could be actually held and a process of secession begin. Thus, the possibility of political and economical shocks is minimized. In conclusion, during the last decades the fight for sovereignty got a new “face”. The idea of a free and independent Quebec has not been abandoned but a new notion has been added to it – a proposal of a special partnership between Canada and Quebec. Designed to maintain the same level of economical integration this offer was a middle way, a third option, and a compromise between federalism and sovereignty. It also involved a possibility of joint political institutions. The proposal, however, had small chances of becoming an official agreement. First of all, the idea of the “new partnership” was used to attract “soft nationalists” and did not have to be approved by the federal government to make sovereignty legitimate. After the victory some of the point could have been “forgotten” be the Quebec leaders. Ottawa, on the other hand, did not show any signs that debates were to be easy. In the case of the constructive negotiations, a pre-required official agreement could change the situation dramatically. …the current Premier of Quebec Lucien Bouchard promised to hold one more referendum at the year of 2003.13 Until next time? |
|
Endnotes and References: |
|
1Robert A. Young, “The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t,” The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada Revised and expanded edition. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 275 2 http://www2.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/top/top102995__side0.html 3Ibid. 4Robert A. Young, “The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t,” The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada Revised and expanded edition. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 289 5Ibid., 273 6Ibid. 7Ibid., 270 8Ibid., 273 9David Cameron, “Limits to Partnership,” ed. The Referendum Papers: Essays on Secession and National Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 395 10 http://www2.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/top/top102995__side0.html 11Robert A. Young, “The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t,” The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada Revised and expanded edition. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 285 12Ibid., 282 13 http://news.lycos.com/headlines/World/article.asp?docid=RTINTERNATIONAL-QUEBEC-POLL&date=20000306 David Cameron, “Limits to Partnership,” ed. The Referendum Papers: Essays on Secession and National Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 384-425 Robert A. Young, “The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t,” The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada Revised and expanded edition. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 265-290 |
Ññûëêè ïî òåìå:
| Quebec Appears on Verge of Rejecting Canada |